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Abstract. Reiterating the importance of having a human factor related safety
reporting system for aviation maintenance to reduce human error and utilizing it
to gain SMS compliance, the REPAIRER method of identifying and reporting
human factors hazards in aviation maintenance is reintroduced. How and why
the REPAIRER method system is of such importance in the implementation of
aviation maintenance safety programs can be linked to the success and evolution
of maintenance resource management and human factors programs which have
been effective in reducing human error in aviation maintenance. These programs
are rooted in effective communication methods, as well as the identification of
human factor elements. To illustrate this point, the successes of maintenance
resource management are discussed. Additionally, the incredible strides that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken to propel a human factors-
centered safety program in aviation maintenance are brought to light with the
FAA’s latest transition of MRM (Maintenance Resource Management) to MxHF
(Maintenance Human Factors). This newly appointed program, which replaced a
decades old FAA MRM program, highlights the significant changes in MRM,
notably the emphasis on human factors. Given the significant shift from MRM
to MxHF, the authors explore the implementation of the REPAIRER aviation
maintenance reporting system under the new guidelines and demonstrate how it
could fulfill many of the desired outcomes of both programs, while still gaining
SMS compliance.
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1 Introduction
In 2018, the authors presented a paper entitled, “The REPAIRER Reporting System for
Integrating Human Factors into SMS for Aviation Maintenance” at the AHFE Con-
ference linking together risk management with human factors in the form of a safety
reporting system for use in aviation maintenance to satisfy the FAA’s new encouraging
policy of SMS for commercial aviation in the US. The theoretical aviation maintenance
safety reporting system came in the form of an 8-step acronym called the ‘REPAIRER’
Reporting System [1]. ICAO’s (International Civil Aviation Organization) SMS
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Table [2] was used as the foundation to support the theory, as seen in Fig. 1, which
contains four safety pillars (Policy, Promotion, Assurance, Risk Management).
Although this model is a good fit for commercial aviation operations in the US, it was
deemed deficient for commercial aviation maintenance operations in the US due to the
fact that the SMS model lacked the integration of human factors. This deficiency was
further supported by relevant research in aviation maintenance, which was compiled
over the last 30 years. The results of that research indicated that maintenance error is
consistently due to human error, with high percentages of error related to maintenance
manuals and procedures. With human error in aviation maintenance established as a
problem, the next step was to review the methods of human factors training currently in
use, industry-wide. Two models were found; Transport Canada’s 12 dirty dozen and the
FAA’s PEAR model. This ultimately led to the creation of the REPAIRER reporting
system for aviation maintenance, as a new way that human factors could be merged into
the SMS table via the Risk Management pillar. The new reporting system was also
supported through the Safety Assurance pillar. In theory, the REPAIRER Reporting
System appears to be a viable solution for aviation maintenance safety moving into the
future. But how can something that looks so good on paper truly work in reality?
2 Implementing REPAIRER into Aviation Maintenance
Where the REPAIRER Reporting System becomes a reality is by executing two more
of the SMS pillars: Policy and Promotion. The Policy pillar is formally putting the
REPAIRER into writing, by explaining how it will be implemented in the organization.
The Promotion pillar is taking the Policy on REPAIRER, and training personnel on
how to effectively use the system, ensuring adequate organizational support during the
Fig. 1. The SMS Table [2]
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process. Although executing these two pillars seems straightforward, this is not always
the case. Aviation maintenance organizations require high levels of output to remain
profitable; at the end of the day, it is a business and as such is economically driven.
Decisions are financially-based. Aircraft that cannot fly represents waste. It is crucial
therefore, that aircraft maintenance be performed efficiently and effectively in order for
these organizations to remain in business. There is also a balance that must be achieved
between safety (through adherence to FAA regulations and inspections) and efficiency.
Any imbalance of safety or efficiency can be dangerous. That is why the REPAIRER
Reporting System, which emphasizes risk management and human factors in SMS, is
so important. It balances both safety and efficiency in aviation maintenance.
The other challenge related to the REPAIRER implementation is culturally-based. In
many cases, maintenance decisions are economically-based, leaving little room for
debate or consideration. As long as FAA regulations are not compromised, the most
efficient method is normally selected. After operating this way for years, introducing new
processes may be met with resistance. However, there are examples of aviation main-
tenance organizations that have taken the next step and gained in safety and efficiency,
due to what is notably referred to as Maintenance Resource Management (MRM).
3 MRM as the Historical Linkage to Making REPAIRER
a Reality
MRM [3] origins can be traced to Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), which
started at NASA and was then adopted by United Airlines in the early 1980s after
United crashed a DC-10 in 1979 into a Portland, Oregon neighborhood after the aircraft
ran out of fuel. The root cause of the accident was found to be miscommunication
between the Captain and the crew members. The Captain mismanaged his time, while
the crew failed to be assertive. Following the accident, United implemented what was
to be a paradigm shift in the cockpit. The Captain was no longer the end all for
decisions, and teamwork became the cornerstone of aircraft operations. United had so
much success with their cockpit safety tool, that the rest of the industry soon followed.
The FAA would eventually make CRM training mandatory on an annual basis for all
US airlines. This training was, and still is, heavily centered around human factors and
the tenants of teamwork, communications, assertiveness, task delegation, management
and leadership. The industry-wide adoption of CRM in the US changed the cockpit
culture from a dictatorship to one of teamwork and crew coordination that has reduced
human error and greatly increased safety.
The idea of MRM came about roughly a decade after the United Portland accident
in 1988, when an Aloha Airlines 737 lost a large section of the fuselage roof during
departure from the Kona, Hawaii airport. Unfortunately, a flight attendant was lost in
the decompression, but the pilot and crew did a magnificent job handling the emer-
gency and were able to land safely at Kahului, Maui. The accident investigation
revealed that failed inspections did not pick up 240 cracks in the skin of that aircraft’s
ceiling. Aloha’s management group was technically knowledgeable and had the
expertise, but organizational human factors had reduced the effectiveness of the Aloha
maintenance program. From this accident the US airline industry and the FAA began to
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address teamwork deficiencies in maintenance and decided to design a product that
would address human factors similar to those found in the cockpit and CRM. The idea
was that CRM addressed immediate, critical effects of human error in the cockpit, so
why couldn’t a similar model be designed to address the often-latent critical effects of
human error in maintenance? The MRM format focussed more on building better
communications, teamwork, effectiveness, and safety in aviation maintenance, while at
the same time it also is attentive to a wider audience of maintainers that includes
AMNTs, inspectors, engineers, staff support personnel and managers. Eventually the
FAA encouraged all commercial aviation organizations in the US to adopt MRM.
4 The Success of MRM in the US Industry
Continental Airlines was the first to implement an MRM program [4]. Taken from their
successful CRM system, the Crew Coordination Concept (CCC) was formed. Designed
specifically for maintenance personnel, the program leveraged communications and
teamwork in order to improve safety and efficiency. Within one year, Continental
Airlines realized a 66% reduction rate in lost workday injuries and mishaps after
training 66% of its personnel. A three-year study of that program concluded with
significant positive effects on safety, assertiveness, teamwork, stress management and
dependability. CCC reduced maintenance error rates and improved human reliability,
which further deemed the program a success. It was so successful that many other large
airlines started MRM-related programs of their own. US Air [5] started a form of MRM
in 1993 that involved not only US Air maintainers and management personnel, but also
the labor union and the FAA FISDO. Teams were formed to rewrite the procedures
manuals. This program was so successful that in 1996, US Air Management initiated a
joint Labor-Management safety process and MRM was the vehicle to do it. Taylor [6]
concluded in 1997 that employee involvement, open communications, and commit-
ment to purpose, with improved technical content in a maintenance system, increased
maintenance safety, efficiency and performance at both Continental and US Air. Taylor
found that both Airlines reaped impressive returns on investment from using MRM
programs. A major goal of MRM is to reduce human error through teamwork and
effective communications. To determine the extent of this reduction, Patankor and
Taylor [7] measured lost time injuries and aircraft ground damage variables at an airline
maintenance facility from 1995 to 1999. The data resulted in a decline in both variables
during the time period. The data also showed the importance MRM refresher training.
However, in 2008, Patankor and Taylor [8] reviewed current MRM programs in the US
industry and found that although initially personnel liked the new MRM programs,
which in turn increased performance, this unfortunately changed over time. AMNTs
and engineers became frustrated with management, which ultimately discouraged
MRM initiatives. Trust between the AMNTs, engineers and management declined. The
trust ingredient, along with good communications, are essential to promoting an MRM
safety culture. The organization as a whole must have a strong commitment to MRM;
these programs provide maintenance employees with nearly limitless tools. Without
managerial and organizational commitment however, the best MRM programs cannot
be sustained.
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5 Success in US Military MRM Programs
After the US commercial industry integrated MRM into aviation maintenance programs
with a good deal of success, the US military aviation industry took note and imple-
mented it as well. The US Coast Guard employed MRM in 1998 and from 2002
onward had trained 100% of their maintenance personnel in MRM. As a result, Coast
Guard accidents rates resulting from maintenance mishaps increased only slightly
between 1998 and 2010. However, during this 12 year period, the cost per maintenance
related accidents was kept stable. Considering the rising cost of parts during that time,
this was truly a remarkable accomplishment for MRM. Although human error was not
measured during the period, the relative stability of maintenance-related accidents for
the US Coast Guard combined with the lower cost per accident is a noteworthy trend in
support of MRM [9]. Another good example is that of the US Air National Guard. In
2005, an MRM program initiated by the Disruptive Solutions Process was implemented
in US Air National Guard aviation units [10] in an effort to decrease maintenance-based
aviation mishaps across its 88 flying wings. Over a three year period following the
introduction of the MRM program, the US Air National Guard Wing reduced its
aviation based maintenance accidents by 75%. In fact, the program was so successful
that it was adopted by the US Air Force in 2006.
6 Who Must Use MRM and to What Extent Must They Use
It?
Despite the research evidence and successes of MRM programs, the concept has not
been formally mandated by the FAA. Although it has been highly encouraged, as
quoted in the FAA Aviation Manual: “There are no regulations mandating any type of
human factors training program, including MRM-specific knowledge or training.” [11]
However, the FAA does list elements of successful MRM programs [12] for mainte-
nance organizations to develop. Understanding the complexities and varying types of
aviation organizations, the FAA endorses the following five elements for a successful
MRM program: senior management support, training for supervisors and middle
managers, continuous communication and feedback, a systems approach and full
participation. In addition to those elements, an MRM program usually consists of the
following human factors related training themes: assertiveness, communication, team
building, conflict resolution, stress management, decision-making and human factors
performance elements [13]. Therefore, MRM is more of a recommendation than it is a
regulation.
7 The Shift from MRM to MxHF at the FAA
Overall, MRM has been an excellent change agent for reducing human error in aviation
maintenance, in both commercial and US military sectors. However, the MRM key
elements to success (senior management support, training for supervisors and middle
managers, continuous communication/feedback, a systems approach and full
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participation) can be somewhat difficult to achieve. Unfortunately, the continuous
successful usage of the communications and teamwork themes that are taught in MRM
do not always work. Failure of any of the key success factors can work against the
continuous execution of the human factors practices MRM offers and ultimately hinder
the entire MRM program. Management support, for example, can be difficult to foster
during times of economic stress. Even if initial MRM training was well-received, if
refresher training cannot be provided, the intent and continued success of the program
could be lost. Another example would be the relationship between union leaders and
managers. Communication and feedback, for example, could easily be affected during
union/management contract negotiations. Additionally, using the FAA recommended
optimal systems approach for implementing MRM through customized training, which
is designed for each maintenance stakeholder, is not an easy task as it requires using an
instructional design model like ADDIE (Assess, Design, Develop, Implement and
Evaluate). Lastly, having the expectation of full participation in the MRM program is
another challenging prospect in any commercial aviation maintenance organization.
Disagreements between line technicians, maintenance engineers, and middle managers
could result with tension and distrust, which undermines MRM philosophies. From
these examples it is easy to see that no matter how good the intentions are to start and
maintain an MRM program, neglecting any of the five factors listed could cause the
program to fail.
The influence of critical success variables that loom continuously over the US
aviation maintenance industry, combined with the fact that maintenance related com-
munication and teamwork training using MRM principles is noteworthy in the pre-
vention of human error in aircraft maintenance, the FAA set out to revise the MRM
Advisory Circular of 2005. In 2017, it was upgraded to include a broader scope of
aviation maintenance human factors training and reclassified as MxHF (Maintenance
Human Factors Training). According to the new FAA circular, MxHF, formally known
“A general process of maintaining an effective level of communication and safety in
maintenance operations.” [14]. The term MRM was used more widely in the 1990s
than in the last decade. In comparison, MxHF is more descriptive, all-encompassing
and widely used in the US aviation maintenance industry today.
8 MxHF
By being more descriptive and all-encompassing, MxHF takes on the following defi-
nition given by the FAA for human factors, “a multidisciplinary field that generates and
compiles information on human capabilities and limitations, and applies it to design,
development and evaluation of equipment, systems, facilities, procedures, jobs, envi-
ronments, staffing, organizations and personnel management for safe, efficient and
effective human performance.” [15] Since 2005, Human Factors training has taken on
important aspects related to communications and teamwork in aircraft maintenance
environments through MRM. MxHF covers the human factors previously identified in
MRM, but expands on it. Common topics that can be found in MxHF training pro-
grams include the following: human factors introduction, safety statistics, safety culture
and organizational factors, human performance and limitations, the physical work
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environment, human error, physiological factors, communication at work, and hazards
in the workplace [16]. With online training materials already available through the
FAA or CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia) websites, MxHF training
programs are not as difficult to implement. With more of an emphasis placed on
comprehensive human factors training, the opportunity for an aviation maintenance
safety reporting system is clear. The REPAIRER reporting system tool leverages
human factors elements to effectively identify and prevent the occurrence and likeli-
hood of human error in aviation maintenance. Such a system would bridge the gap
between human factors and human error using MxHF and other safety protocols
recently mandated by the FAA such as SMS.
9 Integrating REPAIRER into the SMS Table Using MxHF
As depicted in Fig. 2, the implementation of the REPAIRER Reporting system into an
aviation maintenance organization is now feasible. Through the recent creation of
MxHF and the inclusion of the FAA’s recent mandate that all US commercial airline
maintenance organizations implement an SMS program, the new REPAIRER reporting
system was formed. By replacing MRM, MxHF now encourages a broader range of
human factors training. This element, combined with the SMS mandate, brings risk
management and safety to the aviation maintenance environment more formally than in
Fig. 2. The SMS Table [2] with the REPAIRER Reporting System fully integrated by using
MxHF. All four support pillars of the SMS Table integrate either the REPAIRER Reporting
System (blue) or REPAIRER system support (yellow). By Mark Miller 2019.
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previous decades. Prior to these programs, most aviation maintenance organizations in
the U.S. did not make optimal use of maintenance human factors (except in the form of
team/communications through MRM) and even fewer were using a Risk Management
process. As seen in Fig. 2, all four pillars of the SMS Table (Safety Policy, Safety
Promotion, Safety Assurance and Safety Risk Management) can now be supported by
both human factors and operational risk management through the REPAIRER
Reporting System. To have such a system in aircraft maintenance that clearly addresses
human factors hazards through an operational risk management process is of utmost
importance for these organizations. The biggest threat in maintenance is human error.
To stop or minimize this threat, the REPAIRER Reporting System must first be
addressed via the Safety Policy pillar.
10 SMS Safety Policy and REPAIRER Integration
When implementing the REPAIRER Reporting System into an aviation maintenance
organization, it is imperative to first formally write down the scope of the program, as
depicted in Fig. 2 under the Safety policy pillar. Procedurally, the details of the
REPAIRER Reporting System need to be laid out as a road map of how the
REPAIRER Reporting System will be run in the organization and for legal liability
protection. Because the REPAIRER Reporting System will rely on MxHF training, the
specific human factors training which the organization desires must be written as a
prerequisite in order to use the REPAIRER Reporting System properly. Once the
MxHF training is designated (from what is available on the FAA website), the entire
break down of the REPAIRER Reporting System must be explained in relation to that
particular maintenance organization in accordance with how each letter of the acronym
will be carried out. In doing so, the core area of ‘Procedures’ is carried out in support of
the safety policy pillar and SMS requirements. The second core area in SMS Safety
Policy that must be addressed is ‘Organization’. It is important to determine who will
be responsible for the MxHF training and the overall support for the REPAIRER
Reporting System; for this is essential to the overall success of the system. Through
both the ‘Procedures’ and the ‘Organization’ aspects of the SMS Safety Policy, the
REPAIRER Reporting System essentially has an implementation starting point for the
organization.
11 SMS Safety Promotion: Training for MxHF
in REPAIRER
Switching now to the Safety Promotion pillar of the SMS table in Fig. 2, both cases of
human factors (MxHF) and REPAIRER training, can be tailored and customized for
the type and size of the aviation maintenance organization that will utilize the
REPAIRER Reporting system. This is relevant as the REPAIRER Reporting System is
meant to be cost effective, as opposed to MRM which was costly in terms of training
and applicable implementation systems. The REPAIRER reporting system, however,
leverages the human factors training materials provided by the FAA. Using the
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provided human factors analysis, the ‘EPAIR’ portion of the REPAIRER system is
achieved. Other crucial elements that fall under the Safety Promotion pillar include
culture and communication. To ensure optimal use, the REPAIRER Reporting System
requires initial and annual follow-up training. Continued use allows the tool to be
integrated into the existing aviation maintenance culture. Where MRM required a
systems approach through the use of a detailed instructional design tool, REPAIRER
only requires a computer-based instructional format, or a classroom format if needed.
Ideally, the creation of a web computer-based training (CBT) which combined the
specific human factors element along with the MxHF training materials would be the
most effective form of low-cost training for both initial and refresher REPAIRER
training.
12 SMS Safety Risk Assessment: Identifying, Risk
Assessment, and Reporting Hazards – ‘R’ (Reporting Step
in REPAIRER)
In the Safety Risk Management pillar of the SMS Table shown in Fig. 2, the first part
of the first ‘R’ in the REPAIRER Reporting System must be completed. In this initial
step, the hazard within the maintenance environment must be identified and assessed
using risk management. This would seem like an easy task, but sometimes the hazard
can be somewhat difficult as it may be a confluence of human factors errors coming
together. Once the hazard has been identified, it then needs be assessed utilizing a risk
assessment matrix, noting the severity and exposure as critical variables. These two
variables will ensure the hazard receives an accurate rating assessment ranging from
low (non-threatening) to high (dangerous) and can be helpful in prioritizing the hazard.
This form of rating has been proven successful in the U.S. military for over two
decades in the form of Operational Risk Management. It is simple to use and highly
effective. High rated hazards need to be addressed first, while low rated hazards can be
addressed at a later date or when time permits. Rating the hazard initially also provides
the maintenance organization with data on just how dangerous the hazard was prior to
the implementation of corrective measures. Once the maintenance hazard has been
thoroughly identified and rated, it then needs to be reported. To complete the minimum
for reporting a hazard it must be identified, risk rated and then reported into the
reporting system. To accomplish this, the ‘R’ (Reporting step) shifts in the SMS table
to the Safety Assurance pillar in Fig. 2. The idea is to create a Safety Assurance
Reporting System which continuously demonstrates that safety is an ongoing process
within the maintenance organization. Additionally, by setting up an anonymous
reporting system, maintainers will be invited to continuously participate in safety
without fear of retribution. If it the reporting system is set up properly, the maintainers
will be able to see the hazard they reported and follow that hazard through the process.
54 M. Miller and B. Mrusek
13 SMS Risk Assessment: Human Factors Analysis
of the Maintenance Hazard – ‘EPAIR’ (MxHF
of REPAIRER)
What sets the REPAIRER Reporting System apart from other popular safety strategies
is that it is process driven. It is based on criteria that must be met by each of the four
pillars of the SMS table. Secondly, it is centered on being a Reporting System that
involves all maintainers in the safety process. Thirdly, it utilizes a scientific risk
management rating system and most importantly, it directly links maintenance human
factors to human error. Human factors engage several aspects of aviation maintenance:
physiological, psychological and ergonomic (human interface engineering). To prop-
erly use the elements in maintenance to correct for human error, it is necessary to infuse
them into the REPAIRER model via the human factors analysis and risk assessment.
The ‘E’ in the EPAIR represents the specific maintenance environment where the
actual hazard occurred. This includes the physical layout such as lighting and tem-
perature, but also the internal organizational environment at the time of the hazard. The
‘P’ stands for the people involved. Basic things like poor qualifications and training
need to be reported along with any physical, physiological, psychological and ergo-
nomic issues that could be relevant to the hazard. The ‘A’ in the EPAIR human factors
analysis method stands for the actions of the people involved. Because the aviation
maintenance research points toward procedural problems in terms of human error
causing a high percentage of maintenance accidents, it is important to identify what the
people involved with the hazard did or did not do at this juncture. The ‘I’ in the EPAIR
method stands for the investigation of the proper procedure that was associated with
doing the wrong maintenance action in the previous letter ‘A’ for action. This step is
critical because it is imperative to know exactly how the maintenance action was
performed incorrectly, but it is also equally important to know how it should have been
done correctly. This step is important because there is a chance that the current pro-
cedure is unsafe or inefficient and needs to be amended. The next letter in the EPAIR to
complete the human factors analysis in the REPAIRER Reporting System is the ‘R’.
This is the second ‘R’ for the resources that were required in the hazard. If the
resources required to complete the maintenance task were inadequate or used
improperly in relation to the hazard, they will need to be reported here.
14 SMS Safety Risk Management and Mitigation
of the Maintenance Hazard – the 2nd ‘E’ in REPAIRER
(Executing Mitigation Strategy)
With the human factors analysis of the hazard complete, a sound mitigation strategy for
the maintenance hazard can now be created. Not only is the human factors analysis a
large part of the hazard assessment, but it also plays an important role in finding a
solution. The goal of the mitigation strategy is to lower the initial risk rating of the
hazard to acceptable levels, making the maintenance organization safe from that par-
ticular hazard. At first, the solution is simply a plan on a drawing board. But at some
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point, the plan will be carried out and the mitigation strategy becomes the 2nd ‘E’ in
REPAIRER for ‘Executing’. It is important to make sure the mitigation strategy is
executed and carried out successfully. The challenge with this step is following up on
the strategy with some form of reevaluation to prove that it is meeting the original
intent of reducing or eliminating the hazard. This is the last step in the REPAIRER
Reporting System; ‘R’ for ‘Reevaluating’ the hazard. To accomplish this, it is
important to venture back to the Safety Assurance pillar in the SMS table of Fig. 2.
Under the Reporting system are two important SMS methods that stand out to ensure
that the hazard mitigation strategy was working as expected or not. Internal audits are
perhaps the best option through tracking the hazard in the REPAIRER Reporting
System and then seeing how successful the mitigation has been. If the audit proves the
mitigation strategy successful and the risk has been reduced, then the mitigation
strategy has completed its job. However, if the audit finds that it failed to reduce the
hazard to safe levels, it is time to make a ‘Corrective action’ as listed in the Safety
Assurance pillar in Fig. 1. and continue to audit.
15 Conclusion: Building a Safety Culture Through
REPAIRER
The idea of using a safety reporting system like REPAIRER for aviation maintenance
organizations to be the cornerstone of safety is not an unrealistic goal. It has all
necessary elements (safety reporting, risk management, and human factors) working
together to create an efficient and effective safety process. Timing is also important; in
2019 the FAA encouraged aviation maintenance organizations to use the MxHF avi-
ation maintenance human factors training to replace MRM. To accomplish this, the
FAA emphasizes the use of their online human factors training materials. Additionally,
the FAA is also encouraging aviation maintenance organizations in the US to adopt the
elements of the SMS Table. As demonstrated in the paper, the REPAIRER Reporting
System either fulfills the SMS element requirements directly through the REPAIRER
or through the necessity of support for the REPAIRER with one exception. The
exception occurs under the SMS Safety Promotion pillar in the form of the ‘Culture’
element within the SMS Table in Fig. 2. To have true, impacting long term success in
an aviation maintenance organization, the REPAIRER Reporting System would have
to be adopted by the maintainers in that organization as part of their daily operations.
To be a REPAIRER culture, everyone in the organization would have to believe in the
system and actively work to support it. Maintenance personnel must understand that by
using a combination of risk management and human factors that have been integrated
with the proven SMS elements, the REPAIRER Reporting System will save lives,
resources and improve morale. They will be motivated to use it as it something
practical that will seamlessly blend in with their jobs. Organizations that develop
successful cultures not only gain in efficiency, but also have highly motivated
employees that are engaged and involved, ultimately giving the organization a com-
petitive advantage. A REPAIRER Reporting system for aviation safety is waiting on
the shelf and is poised to be implemented into an aviation maintenance organization to
form a winning safety culture. The time is now.
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